Abstract-This paper explores the use of a full-duplex (FD) friendly jammer to secure the communication between a transmitter and a receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. The friendly jammer is considered as a wireless-powered node without embedded power supply but can harvest energy from radio frequency (RF) signals, accumulate it in the storage, and use the harvested energy to perform the cooperative jamming (CJ). A novel CJ protocol termed accumulate-and-jam (AnJ) is proposed to improve the jammer efficiency, which splits the transmission blocks into dedicated energy harvesting (DEH) blocks and opportunistic energy harvesting (OEH) blocks. In DEH blocks, the transmitter transfers wireless power to replenish the jammer. In OEH blocks, the transmitter sends information to the receiver. Using the accumulated energy, the jammer transmits jamming signals to confound the eavesdropper. Meanwhile, thanks to the FD capability, the jammer can continue to harvest energy from the signals overheard from the transmitter. Compared with the existing protocols using a wireless powered half-duplex (HD) jammer, the proposed design possesses the advantage of uninterrupted energy harvesting at the jammer. A closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of the considered system is derived. Numerical results show that our proposed AnJ protocol can significantly outperform its HD counterpart in terms of secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enhancing communication security via exploiting the physical layer properties (i.e., interference and fading) has attracted increasing attention recently. This line of work on physical layer security was pioneered by Wyner. In [1] , Wyner characterized the fundamental notion of secrecy capacity, which is, roughly speaking, the rate difference between the maximum achievable rate of the transmitter-receiver channel (referred to as the main channel) and that of the transmittereavesdropper channel (referred to as the wiretap channel). With a positive secrecy capacity C s , a transmission rate up to C s can be achieved from the transmitter to the receiver while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant of the secrets. However, the existence of a positive secrecy capacity cannot be always guaranteed, especially when the eavesdropper locates closer to the transmitter than the receiver. To address this problem, cooperative jamming (CJ) using artificial noise (AN) has been proposed to introduce deliberate interference at the eavesdropper. Specifically, in CJ schemes, AN is normally designed to lie in the null space of the main channel, and hence it only degrades the wiretap channel [2] .
On the other hand, wireless energy harvesting (EH) techniques have emerged as a new alternative and viable solution to extend the lifetime of energy-constrained wireless networks [3] , [4] . With wireless EH, wireless devices are enabled to harvest energy from ambient radio frequency (RF) signals for functioning. As compared with conventional EH from natural energy sources, wireless EH is more reliable and controllable. Recently, Liu et al. have proposed for the first time to improve the physical layer security via a wireless-powered half-duplex (HD) jammer in [5] , wherein the jammer performs CJ purely based on the energy harvested from the transmitter.
To further advance wireless EH in CJ, in this work, we explore the potential benefits of employing a wirelesspowered full-duplex (FD) jammer to secure the information transmission between a pair of transmitter and receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. In particular, we propose a novel wireless-powered CJ protocol termed accumulateand-jam (AnJ), consisting of dedicated EH (DEH) mode and opportunistic EH (OEH) mode. In DEH, the transmitter transfers wireless power to replenish the jammer. In OEH, the transmitter sends information signals to the receiver. At the jammer, using the harvested energy, it transmits jamming signals to confound the eavesdropper. Meanwhile, owing to the FD capability, the jammer continues to harvest energy from the signals that it overhears from the transmitter. Compared with the existing protocols with a wireless-powered half-duplex (HD) jammer, the proposed design possesses the advantage of uninterrupted EH at the jammer. Therefore, in the long run, the FD jammer can accumulate more energy than its HD counterpart, and hence, support more efficient CJ and achieve better secrecy performance. We also derive a closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability for the considered system. Numerical results validate all theoretical analysis and reveal the merits of the proposed AnJ protocol over its HD counterpart.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We investigate a point-to-point Gaussian wiretap channel consisting of a source (S), a destination (D), a friendly jammer (J), and a passive eavesdropper (E). E attempts to intercept the transmission between S and D without revealing its own presence, thus it may not transmit but only listen. J works in the FD mode and is equipped with N j antennas, whereas all the other nodes (i.e. S, D, and E) work in the HD mode and are equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna. N j = N r + N t , with N r ≥ 1 representing the number of receiving antennas and N t ≥ 2 the number of transmitting antennas. Due to the FD capability of jammer, its battery can be charged and discharged concurrently. To resolve this, we consider that J is equipped with a hybrid energy storage set (HESS), consisting of a primary battery (PB) and a secondary battery (SB) [6] . The PB is connected directly to the transmitter of the jammer. When the transmitter is idle, the harvested energy is delivered straightly into the PB. When the jammer transmits jamming signals, the PB uses its stored energy to power up the transmitter. Meanwhile, the SB temporarily saves the harvested energy and transfers all its stored energy to PB once the transmission finishes. For simplicity, we assume that the capacity of both PB and SB are infinite.
We assume that all the links between S and J suffers from independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rician fading [7] , whereas all the remaining links in the network are subject to Rayleigh fading. This is mainly motivated by the fact that the existence of a line-of-sight (LoS) path between S and J is highly probable because the up-to-date wireless EH techniques can be only operated within a relatively short distance. In addition, we presume that the channel state information (CSI) of the links S-D and J-D is available at both S and J, but the CSI of S-E and J-E is only known to E due to the passive eavesdropping mode. All wireless links are assumed to experience slow, independent, and frequency-flat fading, so the channel gains remain unchanged within each transmission block, but change independently from one block to another. Without loss of generality, the duration of each transmission block is normalized to be one. As a result, the measures of energy and power become identical and thus can be used interchangeably hereafter.
Next, we propose a novel CJ protocol, namely accumulateand-jam (AnJ), for the effective usage of the wireless-powered FD jammer. In the proposed AnJ protocol, at the beginning of each transmission block, S determines its operation by examining the following two conditions: 1) Energy condition: The residual energy at J, denoted by ε, is sufficient to support the CJ with a predetermined transmit power P j . This condition is to avoid the situation that the transmit power of jamming signal is too weak to produce significant interference to E but rather wastes the accumulated energy at J.
2) Channel condition:
The instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at D, denoted by γ D , exceeds a predefined threshold Γ defined as Γ = 2 Rs −1, in which R s denotes the target secrecy rate. This condition is motivated by that the system will certainly suffer from secrecy outage if γ D < Γ, which will be explained clearly when the secrecy outage is formally defined later. If both conditions are satisfied, S transmits informationbearing signals to D. In the meantime, J transmits jamming signals (i.e., artificial noises) deliberately into the null-space of the channel J-D, which thus degrades only the wiretap channel. Thanks to the FD capability, J can use its receiving antennas to perform OEH from the overheard signals transmitted by S at the same time. Otherwise, if at least one condition listed above is not met, S transfers dedicated energy-bearing signals to D and the jammer performs DEH to further charge its battery. Note that there is no security concern in this case as the energy signals transmitted by S may be not secret at all. Overall, from the jammer's perspective, the communication process of the proposed AnJ protocol is composed of two modes: OEH and DEH. Let Φ[n] ∈ {Φ d , Φ o } indicates the operation mode (i.e. either DEH or OEH) for the nth transmission block, we have
In the following, we present the details of the signal processing for each mode. 1) In DEH Mode: S transfers wireless power to J by sending an energy-bearing signal, which is randomly generated and contains no secret information. J uses N r receiving antennas to harvest energy. By ignoring the negligible energy harvested from the receiver noise, the amount of energy harvested by J is given as [8] 
where H sj represents the channel gain of the link S-J, P s is the source transmit power, and η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the energy conversion efficiency.
2) In OEH Mode: S transmits an information-bearing signal x s to D. To confound eavesdropping, J sends a jamming signal x j which is designed to produce a null at D and interfere E only. It is clear that there are enough degrees of freedom to design x j only when N t ≥ 2. Since the CSI of E is not available at J, the AN generation method proposed in [2] 
where h sd represents the channel coefficient of the S-D link, E{|x s | 2 } = 1, and n d is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance σ 2 d . On the contrary, the received signal at E combines the overheard signal from S and the jamming signal from J, i.e.,
where h se ∈ C 1×1 and h je ∈ C Nt×1 represents the channel coefficients for the links S-E and J-E, respectively. To account for the worse case, the power of the AWGN n e is assumed to be zero. The received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at E can be written as
According to [9] , the probability density function (pdf) of γ e is given by
where ϕ P j Ω je /P s Ω se with Ω je E{||h je || 2 } and Ω se E{|h se | 2 }. Thanks to the FD capability, wireless EH at J continues in the OEH mode. By ignoring the energy recycled from its own transmission and the noise, the amount of harvested energy at J in OEH mode is approximately equal to ε h given in (2). It is noteworthy that due to the omission of recycled energy, strictly speaking, the ensuing theoretical analysis in this paper draws a lower bound for the secrecy performance of the proposed AnJ protocol.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. Probability of Cooperative Jamming
It is first desirable to investigate the probability that the jammer is capable of performing the CJ in the proposed AnJ protocol. To this end, we compare the predefined transmit power of J (i.e., P j ) with E{ε h }, which is the average amount of energy harvested by J in one transmission block. Specifically, P j < E{ε h } means that, on average, the harvested energy can fully meet the required energy consumption of CJ. In this case, the energy stored in the PB steadily accumulates during the communication process, which makes the available energy at J always meet the energy condition. Denote by q b the probability that the energy condition is met. We thus have
On the other hand, when P j > E{ε h }, the harvested energy in one transmission block is, on average, less than the consumed energy. As a result, the energy level at the PB stays between zero and P j . In this case, the total amount of harvested energy should approximately equal to the total amount of consumed energy in the long run. Mathematically, with q c denoting the probability of meeting the channel condition, we have
Since the channel between S and J undergoes Rician fading, the CDF of H sj is given by [10] 
where K is the rician factor, Ω sj E{H sj }/N r , and Q Nr (·, ·) is the generalized (N r -th order) Macum Q-function [11] . Therefore, we can obtain E{ε h } as
On the other hand, since the channel between S and D suffers from Rayleigh fading, γ d follows exponential distribution with the average
Substituting (9) and (10) into (7), we have
when P j > E{ε h }. Therefore, the probability of an arbitrary block being OEH and DEH is given by
and
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
We are now ready to characterize the secrecy outage probability, a commonly used secrecy performance metric, of the proposed AnJ protocol. According to [1] , the instantaneous secrecy capacity is defined as
where [x] + = max{x, 0}. Secrecy outage occurs if C s is lower than a target secrecy rate R s [12] . We can express the secrecy outage probability of the AnJ protocol as p AnJ so = Pr{C s < R s }. Through appropriate algebraic manipulations, we obtain the following proposition for the secrecy outage probability of the proposed AnJ protocol.
Proposition 1: The closed-form expression of secrecy outage probability for the proposed AnJ protocol can be given by (16) on the top of the next page, where μ = Proof: By applying the total probability theorem, the secrecy outage probability can be expressed as
First, we evaluate the secrecy outage in the DEH mode. Since no secret data is transmitted in DEH blocks, γ d and γ e both equal zero, and further, C s equals zero. As R s is positive, it can be inferred that
Next, we evaluate the secrecy outage in the OEH mode. Considering that C s and γ d are not independent with each other, but both are independent with the energy random variables, we recast 2 as,
Combining (14) and performing basic mathematical manipulations, we obtain
where f γ d (·) represents the PDF of γ d , and the integral is obtained from [11, Eq. (3.353.2) ]. Therefore, combining 3 with (11), (13), and substituting into (17), we obtain the final result in (16), thus completing the proof.
IV. COOPERATIVE JAMMING VIA A WIRELESS-POWERED HALF-DUPLEX JAMMER
In this section, we consider an alternative CJ protocol with a wireless-powered HD jammer J to provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of the proposed AnJ protocol. To have a fair comparison with J, J is equipped with the same number of N j antennas, but with only one battery. This is because J works in HD mode and there is no need to support simultaneous charging and discharging. Likewise, J is also supported solely by the wireless power acquired from S. During the communication process, J operates in two modes, i.e., the EH mode and the CJ mode. In EH mode, J uses N j antennas for EH. The amount of harvested energy is expressed as
In CJ mode, J uses all N j antennas to transmit jamming signals, and therefore, does not acquire any energy. Using the same method as we derive (11), with q b denoting the probability of meeting the energy condition by J , we have
Corollary 1: Using the similar methods as in deriving (16), the closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability for a system with a wireless-powered HD J can be obtained by replacing N r and N t in (16) with N j , and replacing Fig. 1 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus the transmit power P j for different jamming power P s . We can observe from this figure that the analytical results agree very well with the simulation results, which validates the theoretical analysis in Sec. III. Moreover, it is clear that a distinct optimum jamming power P * j and the minimum secrecy outage probability exist for both FD and HD. As P s increases from 10 dBm to 20 dBm, the optimal P * j also increases. The existence of P * j is because, in short, a higher P j is associated with lower jamming frequency but stronger jamming interference. Fig. 2 shows the secrecy outage probability of the FD and HD schemes versus P s . The jamming power for each is chosen at its respective optimum value. It is observed that the proposed FD scheme achieves significantly lower secrecy outage probability than the HD scheme over almost the entire range of P s .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an accumulate-and-jam (AnJ) protocol that employed a wireless-powered full-duplex jammer to achieve the physical layer security. Closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability was derived for the proposed AnJ protocol as well as its half-duplex (HD) counterpart. Simulation results verified the correctness of our theoretical analysis and revealed that the proposed AnJ protocol can significantly outperform its HD counterpart in terms of secrecy outage probability. 
